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MEMORANDUM

Subject: The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and its European Satellites to Political Warfare, 5 Vols. - Evaluation of.

1. This study was prepared by [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Though government agencies sponsored the project, it is not regarded as an official government paper, but as a completely independent study.

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[REDACTED] The detailed research is of high and scholarly order, but persons with different predispositions might have drawn different conclusions.

2. As a pioneering work in the field of political warfare against the U.S.S.R., this study is of major importance. Its material is logically and conveniently arranged. Volume I contains definite recommendations for U.S. actions, presented first in general fashion, and then in more detail. The other four volumes contain special studies supporting the recommendations in Volume I; Volumes II, III and IV deal with the U.S.S.R. proper, and Volume V with the satellites.

3. As to the recommendations, they may be summarized as follows. The authors do not believe that the U.S. has any clear and consistent goals with respect to the U.S.S.R. and the European satellites. Such goals should be formulated, and should be such as to convince a considerable number of Soviet leaders (particularly, military leaders) that the U.S. has no aggressive designs against traditional Russian interests. At the same time, the satellite leaders should be convinced that the U.S. will not permit a resurgence of German imperialism. The authors base this conclusion, apparently, on the belief that no one in the U.S.S.R. really believes in Marxism and the world revolution, and that traditional Russian nationalism is the real enemy. They expect that the death of Stalin will offer vastly improved opportunities to convince various Soviet leaders of the possibility of reconciling U.S. and Russian interests. Even in the event of war, the U.S. must be extremely careful not to offend Russian nationalism. They doubt very much that there is any chance of carving any viable states out of the U.S.S.R., and seem to believe that some sort of Russian influence over the European satellites is inevitable.

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4. Insofar as the studies supporting these conclusions are concerned, the best are probably the ones dealing with the present Politburo and the question of the succession to Stalin. The weakest are those covering the national minorities problem in the U.S.S.R. Those dealing with Communist ideology, Soviet society, etc., are fair to good.

5. In urging that Russian national interests are the basic motivations of Soviet conduct, and that the U.S. should not attack those interests, the authors have missed one very vital point. Can the Western World, of which the U.S. is now the leader, ever become reconciled to a political organism which, whether under the Tsar or under Stalin, has reached out for control over half the world's land area, population, and resources? Twice in the 20th century, we have joined the British and French to prevent the Germans, generally regarded as superior in civilization to the Russians, from dominating the European continent; can we allow any Russian government to do what the Germans failed to do?

6. For the past 400 years, the Russians have been pushing out from their original center at Moscow. About 150 years ago, it became one of the cardinal principles of British foreign policy to stop the Russian advance whenever possible. There is little doubt that but for British opposition, most of the Middle East, as a minimum, would have been overrun by the Russians before 1900. In both World Wars of the 20th century, the British eased their opposition to Russian imperialism only because of the necessity of Russian help in stopping the Germans. In World War II, we joined the British in this policy; since World War II, we have taken over from them the main responsibility for stopping the Russian advance.

7. Even supposing that certain Soviet leaders are amenable to approaches from us, can we be permanently reconciled even to the present borders of the U.S.S.R. alone? The question should at least be considered. Despite the assertions in this paper, current intelligence suggests that there is a definite possibility of viable states in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Soviet only since 1939), and in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizia, possibly Kazakhstan and Byelorussia should be added. Moreover, Finland, Rumania, and Japan would certainly welcome the return of areas recently seized by the Soviets.

8. The authors of this study make a great point of the moral and democratic loftiness of their position. No doubt they regard it as a forward, progressive step that in the post-war period, nationalities formerly subject to the British, the French and the Dutch have won their independence. Yet, they see nothing inconsistent in this belief and a willingness to permit the Russians to rule over some two dozen non-Russian nationalities.

9. The use of this paper as a guidebook for political warfare might be dangerous. During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson was urged by some

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Leftists to seek a peace on the basis of a return to the 1914 status quo. Wilson refused, on ground that "it was out of the status quo ante that this iniquitous war came forth". The same must be said for theories of political "warfare" with the Soviets.

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